Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive)
Volume 14 Volume 14 (2016)

Article 13

2016

The Importance of the Artist's Intent
Daniel Conrad
rhodospin@smartt.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/liberalarts_contempaesthetics
Part of the Aesthetics Commons

Recommended Citation
Conrad, Daniel (2016) "The Importance of the Artist's Intent," Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive):
Vol. 14 , Article 13.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.risd.edu/liberalarts_contempaesthetics/vol14/iss1/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Liberal Arts Division at DigitalCommons@RISD. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Contemporary Aesthetics (Journal Archive) by an authorized editor of
DigitalCommons@RISD. For more information, please contact mpompeli@risd.edu.

The Importance of the Artist's Intent
About CA
Journal
Contact CA
Links
Submissions
Search Journal

Enter search terms
Search

  Daniel Conrad

Abstract
Does considering artists' aesthetic intentions enrich our experience of art
and enhance art’s aggregate value for human culture? By examining nonaesthetic intent, working motivations, biographical/historical context, and
cases in which an announced intent drives aesthetic transformation, I
argue that, while its specific value varies from case to case, aesthetic
intent is a key part of our cumulative experience of art, correlates with
specific neuroanatomical loci, and raises interesting and compelling
questions specific to this age of automatized thinking.
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1. The question
In experiencing painting, film, literature, theatre, dance, music, and other
arts, is it useful to consider the artist’s intent, including evidence from
previous work, external statements, and historical and personal contexts?
I am not asking if an artist’s intent defines a work’s validity or meaning, if
any. Rather, I am asking if considering that intent can enhance art’s
function, that is, how art affects audiences and, in the aggregate, human
culture. I will show that, while the specific value of intent varies greatly
from case to case, the act of considering it is a vital and central part of
our cumulative experience of art. Moreover, the question has grown in
importance because of recent developments in computational intelligence.
To clarify my approach, I am not addressing this question as a
philosopher but as a practicing artist. I am treating art as an exercise of
the creative process by both artist and audience, and works of art as sets
of patterns or structures that provoke, and thereby enhance, parts of the
mind that make sense of the raw input of our senses. In this model, the
pattern or structure of a work may communicate meaning as a means to
an end but this is not its only function. Rather than focusing on issues of
semantics, I stress more general elements, such as congruence,
symmetry, rhythm, resonance, empathy, expectation, and surprise.
2. Art and nature
First, consider aesthetic objects not made by artists, such as
hummingbirds, sword ferns, and diatoms. Their attraction comes from
structure; they seem designed for a purpose. But as accidents of
evolution, they lack a willed purpose. Instead they display the illusion of
purpose, a purposefulness Kant called Zweckmäßigkeit, and biologist
Jacques Monod called teleonomy. In nature, this purposefulness without
purpose (Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck) mimics intent.
Nature’s illusory intent is discovered by the observer, conferring unity on
the aesthetic object. The sense of significance that arises from this unity
may help one find pattern (Gestalt) or even meaning within life’s chaos. It
also illustrates the deep, natural human compulsion to find or construct
patterns from the substrate of sensation, our ability to acquire new
modes of perception, and the principle that perception and interpretation
are creative acts.

When we intervene in this Zweckmäßigkeit, we can add real intent. This
yields a continuum of increasing intent, from Chinese Lingbi scholars’
rocks (the found art of collecting special rocks from nature) to landscape
photography, plein air painting, Cézanne, Calder, and so on. The
continuum follows the degree of intent along an axis from discovery to
invention. Of course, neither discovery nor invention is pure. Even in
found objects an artist deliberately chose this rock instead of another.
The knowledge that a choice was made may help an audience to seek a
unifying intent. The human need to find pattern is much stronger when
we consider a work as deliberate. Sensing an intent, then, is an
inescapable part of how art affects the audience. Like a Method actor’s
objective, which I shall explore later, the palpability of intent can drive
the experience.
Working empirically, consider the Miletus Torso of Apollo (480 –470 BCE),
a Greek sculpture in the Louvre. In the poem “Archaic Torso of Apollo,”
Rilke, who was mentored by Rodin, implies that this statue gains a gentle
beauty from its unintentional mutilation. (It lacks head and arms.) We
know the amputations are found elements. By contrast, we interpret the
lack of head and arms on Rodin’s L’Homme qui marche (1907) very
differently. We know they were intentionally omitted, so their omission is
more provocative. (See images below.)

3. Non-aesthetic intent
Now consider didactic, commercial, or religious intent in art. The intent to
sell cars, “clean” coal, ideology, or religion affects our responses to this
art. An intent-from-above is ulterior, “interested,” in Kantian terms,
rather than aesthetic. If this ulterior intent competes with the aesthetic
intent, it may rob a work of some of its depth and openness, diminishing
its aesthetic effect.
Pure ulterior intent may use aesthetic means as a contrivance but it does
not ultimately seek to fulfill aesthetic intuition; it has other ends. Take
commercial television. A network’s intent is not to deliver aesthetic
revelations to viewers but to deliver viewers to advertisers. Producers use
aesthetic appeal to attract, not to enlighten, viewers. If anything,
advertisers want audiences less enlightened. Viewers with sharp
interpretive power might be more likely to doubt that a new shampoo will
help them confront life’s challenges.
Of course, ulterior intent does not necessarily ruin a work, especially if it
is accompanied by aesthetic intent and if we can see a form artfully
following the ulterior function. Artists have always had patrons: the Greek
city-states, the Catholic Church, Renaissance dukes, Baroque merchants,
the Chinese Imperial Court, and so on; and they do not necessarily
destroy the art. Moreover, ideology is not always ulterior. Consider Käthe
Kollwitz, Richard Wright, Wisława Szymborska, Goya, Grünewald, and
Brecht. Their ideologies were internal and integral components of their
aesthetics. Still, where the ideology of the patron, church, or nation is
heavily imposed, such as in medieval Europe, Russia in the 1920s, and
contemporary television advertising, there is a risk of artistic death-byulterior-intent. In these cases, artists who escape may yet thrive. The
period of German art between 1933 and 1945 is termed the period of
“exile” (in literature, Exilliteratur), since most of the best artists escaped
from Germany.
Is it useful for audiences to distinguish aesthetic intent from ulterior
intent? Take Eisenstein. His political enemies accused him of formalism,
so he larded his films with ulterior political content. To best appreciate his
work, it helps to know this, so we can make allowances, not to justify,
but to see past superfluous gestures meant to please censors, to see
indirectness and irony.
4. Working motivations and the artist’s own testimony
Some intentions are working motives that drive creativity. In Method
acting, actors try to find objectives. These are not necessarily a
character’s motives, but personal motives to drive uncontrived
performances. We see characters, not the actors inside. An actor may
seem to weep for a lover by using their memory of a parent’s death as a
motive, even if it is not congruent with the character. Does it help the
audience to know an actor’s private objective? While the specific private
intent may not be very useful to spectators, the palpability of that intent
carries authenticity, and the effect on those spectators can be very
powerful.
How can pre-set private working motives generate authentic
performances? When Method actors perform, they find real moments
through “non-initiation.” Though following private motives, they do not

initiate action de novo. Instead, they respond intuitively to their
partner(s). They give up only that part of their motivation that involves
premeditation. When working solo, the audience is the partner. There
may be rational planning in constructing performances, but the aesthetic
choices are intuitive, un-premeditated responses.
Private working motivations do not always stay private. James Joyce
organized his novel Ulysses by superimposing elements of Homer’s
Odyssey on Dublin’s geography, the time of day, different prose styles,
and so on. The correlations are not Procrustean; Joyce does not follow
Homer chapter by chapter. But they are more than devices; they are
motives, pulling him along, revealing order choice by choice. Readers can
feel his intent, educing unity from a poly-vocal work.
Is it useful to study this intent from outside sources, including biography
and history. Joyce started writing Ulysses in 1914, and called history “...a
nightmare from which I am trying to awake.”[1] Moreover, Joyce
deliberately leaked his use of mythological resonance to Larbaud[2] and
others.[3] The vague superimposition of the Odyssey and the myth of
Daedalus on the ironic heroes Dedalus and Bloom, Joyce’s self-exile and
loss of faith, his views on naturalism and romanticism,[4] and his
adaptation of stream of consciousness may be useful knowledge to
readers. This external testimony describes a kind of heroic/ironic voyage,
adaptable to a reader’s life, making personal, historical, and formal sense.
This is more visible in the context of Joyce’s declared intent.
Joyce’s work feels uncontrived. What allows his pre-set rules to transcend
contrivance? It is the Method actor’s principle of non-initiation. The
“partner” he is responding to here is that momentary combination of
external accident and internal choice that acts as a transient partner in
most creative acts.
Gerhard Richter’s “smear” paintings and Jackson Pollock's “drip” paintings
also use non-initiation. Semi-accidents are followed by a selective process
using internal, intuitive choice. Many semi-chance events are tested, and
the artists choose only what works, placing their bets after the roulette
wheel stops.
One virtue of working with external accident and intuitive choice is that it
allows artists to probe the workings of motivations that lie within their
unconscious minds. This can be a deeply creative act. As Eric Kandel
frames it in his elegant study of Viennese Expressionist art and the
origins of Modernism, “...human creativity – the creativity that led
Copernicus and Darwin to their theories – stems from conscious access to
underlying, unconscious forces.”[5]
5. Personal and historical context
For audiences pursuing their own intuitive responses, artists’ personal
contexts can sometimes be illuminating. The poetry of Li Qingzhao, from
the late Song dynasty, makes deeper sense if readers know of her exile
in south China. Or consider Stendhal, a progenitor of modernism.
Disillusioned by Napoleon’s fall and mid-nineteenth century romanticism,
he went into self-exile in Italy and said he was writing for twentieth
century readers. As Joyce, another exile, stated, “The supreme question
about a work of art is out of how deep a life does it spring.”[6]
Personal and historical trajectories also intersect in painting. A Cubist
work by Picasso is enhanced when flanked by other Cubist works, but it
makes even more sense in a larger context. As John Berger noted, the
best Cubist work was made between 1907, after Cézanne’s death, and
the start of World War I in1914, a short period of rapid and optimistic

historical evolution. Cubism “...recreated the syntax of art so that it could
accommodate modern experience,” a buoyant pre-war experience marked
by failing old institutions, promising new technologies, and new
mathematics of space and time.[7]
In the Great War, space, time, and vision changed again in the poetry of
Wilfred Owen, foreshadowing work by Paul Celan and Anna Akhmatova,
whose intentions are more visible in the light of their personal histories.
Knowing these histories may enrich the readers’ experiences.
Picasso painted Guernica (1937) for Spain to exhibit at the Paris World’s
Fair. It was intended to have a political impact. Picasso was enraged by
the bombing of the Basque village of Guernica by Spanish Fascists. He
testified, “Painting is not done to decorate apartments. It is an instrument
of war against brutality and darkness.”[8] Here the political intent is not
ulterior to Picasso’s aesthetic intuition but is as much a part of it as the
paint. It may greatly help the viewer to know both the historical event
and Picasso’s connection to it.
More intimately, Pierre Bonnard, an avid reader of Bergson and Mallarmé,
wrote about perception as an active process, continually reassembling
itself over time in collaboration with memory. His late work, painted from
memory, takes time to see. It feels archeological. If you take time to
look, layers of foreground and background may melt together or separate
and objects on the margins take form. In 1893, he met a woman stepping
from a streetcar. She called herself Marthe and said she was sixteen.
Actually, she was twenty-four. Bonnard painted her all the rest of her life,
including many paintings of her in her bath, when she was in her fifties
and sixties. In this work, her body is always twenty-four, and it merges
into the complex light of the background. If we know that Bonnard
studied time and memory and was exquisitely sensitive to the passing of
time, we may more easily arrive at the realization that we must take time
to see these time-inflected paintings.
In cinema also, knowing about a director’s life can enrich the way we
watch. Take Las Hurdes: Tierra Sin Pan (Land Without Bread, 1933), Luis
Buñuel’s ironic documentary. If a program error had mistakenly credited
the film to Carl Dreyer, and you had seen Dreyer’s The Passion of Joan of
Arc (1928), you might interpret Las Hurdes as a tragic social-issue film
and miss its mordant irony. If, though, you knew it was Buñuel’s film and
knew of his life and philosophy, you would likely see a richer version of
the film. Many naïve viewers at the time of the film’s release
misinterpreted Las Hurdes as tragic.
6. Intent as part of the work: the act of transformation
When Song dynasty Chinese scholars chose naturally occurring Lingbi
rocks to display, they treated them as works of art. While they did not
create these works, they were exercising aesthetic choice, removing rocks
from nature and directing their visitors (the audience) to see them as art.
They were announcing their intent. By themselves, the rocks were works
of nature; with the addition of the scholars’ intent, they could fulfill the
functions of art.
If announced intent can be an integral part of a work, and Lingbi scholars’
rocks function as art partly by virtue of intent, then is a urinal, for
example, art if an artist signs it? I posit that this depends on the
particular urinal and the particular context. A work that carries only the
idea that a signed thing is art may primarily appeal to theorists; intent
may categorize an object as art, but categorization alone may not make
the object worth looking at. As Duke Ellington noted in the eponymous
song, “It don’t mean a thing if it ain’t got that swing.”

On the other hand, mundane objects may function brilliantly as art if, for
example, the artist uses the specific formal grace or context of an object
to generate its elevation from the mundane. This worked for the Lingbi
scholars, Degas, Pina Bausch, and others. Realistic representations of
found mundane objects, discovered by close examination of mundane life,
worked well for Flaubert, Joyce, Zola, Vittorio De Sica, van Gogh, and
others. At its simplest, most minimal level, if someone just points to an
old pair of shoes or a cast-iron art-nouveau pissoir, and says “Look!,”
that momentary act might move the viewer’s creative faculties to the
point of revelation. In that case, the simplest work may be a momentary
experience, propelled by an uncontrived aesthetic intent that sets it apart
from nature and transforms it. What kind of transformation is this?
In an old example of this transformation, Tetsugen, a seventeenthcentury Buddhist, raised funds to print an edition of the Sutras. He toured
Japan for years, raising money. At one point he arrived at a region
ravaged by floods. He used all his money to feed the local people, and
then resumed fundraising. Years later, he came to an area devastated by
an epidemic. He used all his money to buy medicine, saving many lives.
He finally finished collecting enough money to publish an elegant woodblock edition of the Sutras. When admirers praised it, the response was:
“It’s nothing; you should have seen the first two editions.”
A recent example involves the Chinese artist Ai Weiwei who, in 2009,
investigated the deaths of over 5,000 schoolchildren from the collapse of
poorly built schools in the Sichuan earthquake. He mounted an exhibition
at Munich’s Haus der Kunst using some 9,000 tiny backpacks, and was
subsequently beaten almost to death by Chinese police. He later posted
the names of 5,000 young victims online, and when the authorities
responded by destroying his new Shanghai studio, he publicly claimed
that their act of demolition was one of his finest works of art, a work
defined almost entirely by his claimed intent and his personal context,
and which succeeded as art by provoking aesthetic revelation in his
audience.
7. Situational approaches to intent
Many stated intentions by artists are less useful than Ai Weiwei’s.
Kandinsky’s writing, for example, may seem hermetic. However, if we
take his work from 1908 to 1918, and observe his passage to abstraction
in the context of other artists (Matisse, André Derain, Alexj Jawlensky,
and Marianne von Werefkin), and the events of 1914, the pattern has a
sense of purpose. Even if we might not fully grasp his specific “inner
need,” this sense of purpose moves the work along the path from
accidental to deliberate in the viewer’s mind.
If an artist’s intent is ungraspable, can searching for it be rewarding? In
The Brothers Karamazov, Father Zosima has saintly healing powers. He
tells his acolyte, Alyosha, to leave his monastery, enter the world, and
practice love. Then he dies. By Orthodox tradition, saints’ bodies do not
putrefy, but Zosima’s body rots hideously. The stench fills the monastery,
as if by some dark miracle.
What was Zosima’s intent? Since Zosima is fictional, we are asking for
Dostoevsky’s intent. Perhaps Zosima, who valued humility, did not (to
Dostoevsky) want to be worshipped after death, so he willed his
putrefaction. Maybe he was testing Alyosha’s faith, so the young man
would learn love by entering the world (which is what happens). Or
maybe he wanted us to see that putrefaction is natural, and that love is
the only surviving miracle. Or, as Joyce Carol Oates posits, maybe this
life-affirming novel contends against its dark reflection; characters and
ideas are doubled, and we have to make sense of this.[9] Putrefaction

would then balance Zosima’s life-affirming heart.
The key point here is not what answer we give to these fictional
questions of intent but that we are drawn to imagine answers. And this
imagining makes us, in a sense, authors. The author himself withholds
explanation. Does it help us to consider his life? He was a deeply religious
utopian socialist with a strong sense of justice. He spent four years in an
inhuman Siberian prison on political charges, had a gambling addiction,
and suffered from epilepsy. He appears to have had a penetrating
knowledge of the human heart. If we learn this history, it does not give
us answers; however, it adds to the provocation of the question.
Dostoevsky compels us to pursue the rich question of Zosima’s intent in
the way we pursue the intent of Shakespeare’s fictional Prince Hamlet,
which I explore later. Our continued pursuit of these unanswerable
questions can be intensely aesthetic because we pursue them as artists
might. Thus, while we may never arrive at a fixed, communicated
meaning, the effect of the author’s provocation is felt deeply.
8. The intent of the audience
Umberto Eco proposed that many contemporary artists intentionally leave
the interpretation partly open, offering “open work” with fields of potential
sense. The audience completes the creative act, becoming, in a sense,
artists. In this collaboration, they find their own intent. Eco actually posits
three intentions: intentio auctoris (of the author), intentio lectoris (of the
reader), and intentio operis (of the work).[10] This last refers to an ideal
work with its own idealized intent, through which Eco’s idealized Model
Author and Model Reader generate each other.
In open work, each spectator can see a work of art differently. One of the
strengths of open work is precisely this adaptability, unfettered by fixed,
specific meanings. Choreographer Paul-Andre Fortier told me that after
one of his performances a woman told him his work inspired her to get a
divorce. He then told himself that what he was doing was “pas inutile”
(not useless). His gift to her was not meaning, per se, but creativity.
Audiences may imagine an artist’s intent by imagining that artist’s
persona; this is how Eco’s Model Author is constructed. This imagining can
be richly rewarding. As I argue later, spectators can, in this way, learn
something of the artist’s creative process.
There are risks, of course. A work of art need not carry a fixed meaning
but audiences may assume one, leading to what we might call
"semiopathy," perceptual inflammation from excess meaning. For
example, in London’s National Gallery, Goya’s portrait of Doña Isabel de
Porcel (1805) displays a faint shadow on her chin. Is it a beard? X-rays
reveal only the pentimento of an eyebrow from previous work, so Goya
likely did not intend an epicene reference. Some viewers might invent
one, though, leading them to form impoverished responses to the rest of
Goya’s oeuvre. In like manner, biographical details, especially those which
verge on gossip, can be highly misleading. Not all art is autobiographical,
and even when it is, literal-minded application can create a shallow
experience.
Confounding the matter, artists may deliberately make apparent errors.
But if we know John Coltrane’s squawks and Ornette Coleman’s slurs are
deliberate, the sense may become audible. External evidence may help.
Watching videos of Coltrane or Coleman playing may be useful in this
regard. In a similar way, Hans Namuth’s 1951 film Jackson Pollock 51
gives us a sense of Pollock’s intent and a wider repertoire of ways to see
his work.

9. Artist’s statements: bad cases make bad law
Thus, to avoid confusion, artists may write statements. Such writings are
often unhelpful guides to an artist’s intentions. They may be fraudulent,
inept, opaque, or even irrelevant. The artists themselves may not even be
conscious of their intent. Nor can a claimed methodology validate a
fatally contrived or didactic work. As Louis Aragon stated, “If you produce
wretched imbecilities by following a Surrealist procedure, wretched
imbecilities they remain.”[11]
But bad cases make bad law: Roland Barthes, criticizing the authority of
authors, denied that the “author-god” (the artist) had ultimate power
over a work’s sole, “theological” meaning.[12] Bakunin, inverting Voltaire,
said if there really were a God, we would have to abolish him. In that
playful spirit (not Nietzsche’s), Barthes abolished not just the bourgeois
author-god, but the author, claiming literature was born of language and
authors were midwives.
To be fair, Barthes wanted us to find our own interpretations rather than
relying on unknowable authors. However, though artists cannot enforce
an interpretation of their work, is considering their intent a categorical
fallacy? Applying Barthes’s own argument, a work may lack a fixed
interpretation, since the audience needs to be free to interpret. But then
art functions in the passage between chaos and sense, where it engages
the creative process in the audience; and in that passage, they are free to
ponder an intent. Then the goal becomes discovering the richest
experience of that work, using all our resources.
As mentioned briefly in the introduction, I am working within a
provocation model, in which works of art, by virtue of their patterns or
structures, provoke, and thereby enhance, parts of the mind that make
sense of raw sensory input. Here, addressing Barthes's erasure of the
author, our provocation model has an advantage over a pure
communications model. Because we are focusing on experience (individual
response to an artistic provocation rather than an intended meaning), it is
easier to discuss how audiences’ knowledge of the artist can be part of
their transformational response to the art. By contrast, in a
communications model, we would have to include the artist as part of the
code, which is conceptually clumsier.
10. Textualism
Some intentions are visible in works of art. One can argue that if an
intent is visible in a work, the artist is irrelevant, while if it is invisible,
the intent is irrelevant. This argument assumes everything in the work is
visible without external context, yet I have cited works in which artists’
identities and contexts greatly aid visibility, and in which external
evidence of intent, such as Ai Weiwei’s, may operate synergistically as a
creative element in its own right. One of the basic principles of the
neurophysiology of pattern recognition is that things become visible within
contexts and with external reference. So there is valuable space between
the extreme poles of what is in the work and outside the work.
In the case of literature, the New Critics proposed that art could evoke
specific emotions without reference to biography, history, and the like.
This model stresses the effect of the work on the audience, which would
seem to be compatible with a provocation model. However, the New
Critics, because they proscribe studying an author’s life and historical
context, run into problems when such study is relevant. In New Critic T.
S. Eliot’s own critique of Hamlet, for example, he judges the play “an
artistic failure,” as it does not fully account for its hero’s emotions.[13]
Are Hamlet’s emotions too opaque? Or does Eliot, by cleaning the play of

its author’s life, resemble Kenneth Rexroth’s riverine raccoon who, when
given a lump of sugar, washes it in the stream until it all dissolves
away?[14]
We may not know a great deal about Shakespeare’s life but most
educated audience members know that he acted in, wrote for, managed,
and co-owned a theater. Through his plays, we know that he used
theater as an existential trope; that he was deeply concerned with the
theatrical themes of identity versus imposture and reality versus illusion;
and that he often revealed character slowly. Thus, he may have
deliberately intended to hide the logic of Hamlet’s emotions, as Hamlet,
himself an actor and a playwright, does. Is he mad in some way? Why is
he slow to take revenge? Is the ghost real? Is Hamlet real? His existential
problems, strangely, are ours. We empathize even as we look for
answers. We may feel these questions concerning Hamlet’s mind more
vividly in a context that includes some knowledge of the author and how
we imagine his motives.
Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia argued for an author-free
textualism: “If the ringing of an alarm bell has been established, in a
particular building, as the conventional signal that the building must be
evacuated, it will convey that meaning even if it is activated by a
monkey.”[15] The linguist Mark Liberman responded: “I question the
implication that people who hear a fire alarm interpret its meaning
without paying any attention to theories of how it was activated: on
Scalia's theory, how can we make sense of the everyday concept ‘false
alarm’? When I'm told that a particular alarm is due to a circuit fault (or a
mischievous monkey, though monkeys are thin on the ground in
Philadelphia), I don't conclude that the conventional meaning of the fire
alarm signal has changed, but I do join everyone else in aborting the
evacuation.”[16]
If on/off fire alarms can transcend semantic rules, this is surely more so
for art, which can be multivalent. In literature, for example, rather than
being mere servants of language, artists may invent new language even
as we read. Reading, say, Virginia Woolf, we follow a moving target
propelled by her intent. And while her intentions are not transparent,
neither are they totally opaque, given our knowledge of and empathy
with her life. These intentions, however we may see, deduce, or imagine
them, form a context that partly governs how we derive sense from her
work, that is, how the work functions.
Beyond literature, as Barthes himself laments, non-textual art is even less
accessible to semiotic systems.[17] Music, abstract painting, and much
contemporary dance, for example, are largely non-semantic.
11. The larger significance of intent, and some neurophysiological
speculations
Art may engage neural pathways of aesthetics with little reliance on
semantics by using other faculties. These include empathy with imagined
artists, including their created characters, and an insightful ability to
construct a “theory of mind,” giving us access to the emotions and
motivations of others; and Gestalt functions, such as rhythm, symmetry,
harmony, novelty, congruity, incongruity, resonance, filtering out the
noise, connecting the dots, and surprise. Evidence for such aesthetic
models has been persuasively summarized by Consoli and
Kandel.[18],[19] Interestingly, some aesthetically linked functions display
anatomic specificity in fMRI studies; and lesions at specific neural loci are
thought to weaken some of the insightful, empathic, or Gestalt
functionality, potentially giving rise to disorders such as autism or
prosopagnosia.

When it comes to empathy and other functions depending on a “theory of
mind,” this directly implicates the audience’s construction of the imagined
artist in its reception of the work. Accordingly, if we take an intuitive view
of the artist’s intent, using our faculties of pattern recognition, empathy,
and insight to look into the minds of others, we may see a lineage of
intent, as Milan Kundera does in his brilliant study of novels.[20] We may
even see patterns in what Woolf chose from Joyce, Joyce from Flaubert,
and Flaubert from Stendhal, in the same way we see patterns of fractals
from iterations of recursive equations without analyzing individual
iterations.
Now consider intent in the aggregate, beyond individual artists. I posit
that the cumulative effects of pondering the intentions of many artists in
the context of their work are extremely valuable. Why is the urge to
share aesthetic intent ubiquitous across cultures? In any culture, when
you work with paint, notes, or words, the material incites you to
transform it. These transformations nurture a plasticity (in this case, a
fluid creativity) of mind. This ultimate intention of plasticity supersedes
any proximate one. Plasticity itself, though empty, is filled with creative
possibility. Recall the empty room in the wind-swept house at the end of
Virginia Woolf’s To the Lighthouse, a novel that explores artistic intent
from the inside.
What art offers, then, is not just objects or moments but, ultimately, the
artist’s fluid, uncontrived process of creation. When we experience many
works of art over time, we acquire some of that process. We adapt,
however inaccurately, the intentions of artists. Learning many intentions,
however imperfectly, is valuable far beyond what we get from individual
works. Thus, looking for intent is a key part of the experience and,
although specific meaning may or may not be present in individual works,
the process of extracting pattern or meaning (making sense) from chaos
is central to the larger experience of art.
I previously proposed a neurological model for how aesthetic experience
helps the brain form new modes of perceiving and making sense.[21]
These new modes replicate through culture. Creative processes, that is,
finding new ways of seeing patterns, listening, and making sense,
mediate creation for individual artists. Through their forms—works of art
—they are stored or handed down within culture to enable sharing, and
then adapt to changing conditions over time.
Aesthetic intent, then, has two components: the modes of artists’ creative
processes and the drive to share these modes. This sharing is conserved
across cultures, so it likely has survival value. I propose that its survival
value is its power to enhance the perceptual and interpretive repertoires
of others.
In hunting-gathering cultures, individual luck varies, so the kill or harvest
is shared. Personal survival depends on the luck of the group, so
enhancing the group’s adaptive perceptual agility helps one’s own
survival. Our conserved drive to make and share art still carries survival
value, offering new ways to adaptively reinterpret our changing world and
see emerging patterns.
12. The dangers of commercial and automatized intent
I have argued for the importance of artists’ aesthetic intent in individual
works of art, the value of this intent in the aggregate experience of art,
and the survival value of that experience. To take my argument further,
if aesthetic intent carries survival value, what happens if commercial
intent replaces it?

Artists’ aesthetic intentions, when we absorb them, help us to be like
artists in the world, to find creative ways to see patterns of change. If
aesthetics yields to commerce, the danger is not that we will buy the
wrong toothpaste but that we will be blinded by contrived patterns. Then
the artistic process, which should be helping us to adapt to the
unanticipated, loses survival value.
As an example of contrived patterns, take recent trends in commercial
music. As author/musician John Gray explains: “In commercial recording,
trumpets have been replaced by samplers, operated by one-handed
pianist-technicians, in total ignorance of its sound, range, the role of
breath and tongue in phrasing, and the distinctive way the trumpet
negotiates a melody…. In its wisdom, the commercial marketplace has
decreed that music is primarily aural wallpaper to enhance other
activities, like driving a car or shopping.”[22]
Moreover, that marketplace is becoming automated. On the Internet,
commercial curatorial systems count “hits,” like TV ratings systems. And
while the ’net happily opens public space to artists, it also fosters free
appropriation, making it harder for artists to survive. This free content is
hosted by sites supported by advertising and the harvesting of personal
information.
This is not to say that the idea of artistic identity will disappear. Certain
robust identities will even thrive: brands, promoted by advertisements,
the one component of internet content (and intent) protected from
appropriation.
Creative intent will become more removed from individual artists as
decisions are increasingly made not by a collective “hive mind” but by
artificially intelligent simulations of that mind, using user-input to adjust
the algorithms. Such algorithms prioritize ratings, so they tend to
generate transient, sensational work. As in other commercial art, the
nature of the intent—in this case an automatized intent that we might
term intentio ex machina—may degrade the value of the work.
Norbert Wiener, the prescient progenitor of cybernetics, observed as far
back as 1950 that artificially intelligent systems are dangerous because
they follow instructions blindly.[23] They are rule-bound, lacking
empathy, conscience, and an understanding of human needs. They do not
give you what you want (intent) but, very literally, what you ask for. This
can yield unhappy surprises when the instructions are “maximize profits”
or “increase viewership.”
When artificially intelligent systems are applied to making art, these
dangers can self-amplify. As I have argued here, art ideally functions to
enhance our aggregate perceptive and interpretive faculties, enabling us
to see and adapt to unforeseen, unhappy surprises, which is what confers
its survival value. But automated, commercial art, instead of helping us
see the dangers of automatized, commercial thinking, blinds us to those
very dangers. This art, degraded by an automatized intent, loses survival
value. Thus, when we argue for the value of the aesthetic intentions of
individual artists, we are arguing for the value of those same human
artists and the dangers of the artificially intelligent alternatives. In the
twenty-first century, then, the “death of the artist” is more than just a
theoretical idea.
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